Abstract Audio splicing is one of the most common manipulation techniques in the area of audio forensics. In this paper, the magnitudes of acoustic channel impulse response and ambient noise are proposed as the environmental signature. Specifically, the spliced audio segments are detected according to the magnitude correlation between the query frames and reference frames via a statically optimal threshold. The detection accuracy is further refined by comparing the adjacent frames. The effectiveness of the proposed method is tested on two data sets. One is generated from TIMIT database, the second is made in four acoustic environments using a commercial grade microphones. Experimental results show that the proposed method not only detects the presence of spliced frames, but also localizes the forgery segments with near perfect accuracy. Comparison results illustrate that the identification accuracy of the proposed scheme is higher than the previous schemes. In addition, experimental results also show that the proposed scheme is also superior to the previous works. A real-world meeting recording database (AMI corpus) is also used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method for practical applications.
Introduction
Digial media (audio, video, and image) has become a dominant evidence in litigation and criminal justice, as it can be easily obtained by smart phones and carry-on cameras. Before digital media could be admitted as evidence in a court of law, its authenticity and integrity must be verified. However, the availability of powerful, sophisticated, low-cost and easyto-use digital media manipulation tools has rendered the integrity authentication of digital media a challenging issue. For instance, audio splicing is one of the most popular and easyto-do attack, where target audio is assembled by splicing segments from multiple audio recordings. Audio splicing attack can be easily archived by using audio editing softwares, such as Adobe Audition. The user can simply copy an audio segment and replace or paste into another audio segment. Usually, in order to make the spliced audio to be heard normal, the splicing should occur in at the silence part of the audio. Thus, in this context, we are trying to provide authoritative answers to the following questions, which should be addressed such as: (1) Was the evidentiary recording captured at location, as claimed? (2) Is an evidentiary recording "original" or was it created by splicing multiple recordings together?
The research on audio/speech forensics dates back to the 1960s, when the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted an examination of audio recordings for speech intelligibility enhancement and authentication [12] . In those days, most forensic experts worked extensively with analog magnetic tape recordings to authenticate the integrity of the recording by assessing the analog recorder fingerprints, such as length of the tape, recording continuity, head switching transients, mechanical splices, overdubbing signatures and etc. Authentication becomes more complicated and challenging for digital recordings as the trace of tampering is much more difficult to detect than mechanical splices or overdubbing signatures in the analog tape. Over the past few decades, several efforts have been initiated to fill the rapidly growing gap between digital media manipulation technologies and digital media authentication tools.
For instance, the electric network frequency (ENF)-based methods [10] utilize the random fluctuations in the power-line frequency caused by mismatches between the electrical system load and generation. This approach can be extended to recaptured audio recording detection [27] and geolocation estimation [6] . However, the ENF-based approaches may not be applicable if well-designed audio equipment (e.g., professional microphones) or battery-operated devices (e.g., smartphones) are used to capture the recordings.
On the other hand, statistical pattern recognition techniques were proposed to identify recording locations and acquisition devices. For instance, techniques based on time/frequency-domain analysis (or mixed domains analysis) [13] have been proposed to identify the trace of double compression attack in MP3 files. A framework based on frequency-domain statistical analysis has also been proposed by Grigoras [9] to detect traces of audio (re)compression and to discriminate among different audio compression algorithms. Similarly, Liu et al. [17] have also proposed a statistical-learning-based method to detect traces of double compression. The performance of their method deteriorates for low-to-high bit rate transcoding. Qiao et al. address this issue by considering non-zero de-quantized Modified Discrete Cosine Transform (MDCT) coefficients for their statistical machine learning method and an improved scheme has been proposed recently [24] . Brixen in [2] has proposed a time-domain method based on acoustic reverberation estimated from digital audio recordings of mobile phone calls for crime scene identification. Similar schemes using reverberation time for authentication have been studied by Malik [19, 20] . However, these methods are limited by their low accuracy and high complexity in model training and testing. Additionally, their robustness against lossy compression is unknown. And also, these methods cannot detect the presence of splicing. In [11, 18, 20, 21, 29, 30] , model-driven approaches to estimate acoustic reverberation signatures for automatic acoustic environment identification and forgery detection where the detection accuracy and robustness against MP3 compression attacks are improved.
Recently, audio splicing detection has attracted a number of research interests. However, all the above methods were not primarily designed for audio splicing detection and their applicability for audio splicing detection is unclear. A method based on higher-order time-differences and correlation analysis has been proposed by Cooper [4] to detect traces of "butt-splicing" in digital recordings. Another audio splicing detection scheme is based on the analysis of high-order singularity of wavelet coefficients [3] , where singular points detected by wavelet analysis are classified as forged. This method assumes that the splicing procedure introduces non-continuity at the splicing location. This method is designed to detect the non-continuity points. This method has perfect performance for noise-free audio. However, authentic real-world recordings also have many non-continuity points due to the background noise. Experimental results show that their method has large false positive rate. Pan et al. [22] have proposed a time-domain method based on higher-order statistics to detect traces of splicing. The proposed method uses differences of the local noise levels in an audio signal for splice detection. It works well on simulated spliced audio, which is generated by assembling a pure clean audio and a noise audio. However, it has large error rate for real-world recordings, especially the splicing segments have similar levels of background noise.
In the previous works [20, 21, 29, 30] , the authors have shown that acoustic reverberation and ambient noise can be used for acoustic environment identification. One of the limitations of these methods is that these methods cannot be used for splicing location identification. And also, researchers have proposed various methods for the applications of audio source identification [10] , acquisition device identification [23] , double compression [13] and etc. However, applicability of these method for audio splicing detection is missing.
This paper presents a novel approach to provide evidence of the location information of the captured audio. The magnitudes of acoustic channel impulse response and ambient noise are used as intrinsic acoustic environment signature for splicing detection and splicing location identification. The proposed scheme firstly extracts the magnitudes of channel impulse response and ambient noise by applying the spectrum classification technique to each frame. Then, the correlation between the magnitudes of the query frame and the reference frame is calculated. The spliced frames are detected by comparing the correlation coefficients to the pre-determined threshold. A refining step using the relationship between adjacent frames is adopted to reduce the detection errors. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme outperforms the state-of-art works described above.
Compared with the existing literatures, the contribution of this paper includes: 1) An audio splicing detection framework using environmental signature is proposed; 2) Room impulse response is exploited for audio splicing detection; 3) Similarity between adjacent frames is proposed to reduce the detection and localization errors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The audio signal model and the environmental signature estimation algorithm are introduced in Section 2. Applications of the environmental signature for audio authentication and splicing detection are elaborated in Section 3. Experimental setup, results, and performance analysis are provided in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 5 along with the discussion of future research directions.
2 Audio signal modeling and signature estimation
Audio signal model
In audio recording, the observed audio/speech will be contaminated due to the propagation through the acoustic channel between the speaker and the microphone. The acoustic channel can be defined as the combined effects of the acoustic environment, the locations of microphone and the sound source, the characteristics of the microphone and associated audio capturing equipment. In this paper, we consider the model of audio recording system in [30] . For the beginning, let the s(t), y(t), η(t) be the direct speech signal, digital recording and background noise, respectively. The general model of recording system is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this paper, we assume that the microphone noise, η Mic (t), and transcoding distortion, η T C (t), are negligible because of that high quality commercial microphone is used and the recordings are saved as raw format. One kind of transcoding distortion (lossy compression distortion) will be considered in the experiment later. With these assumptions, the model in Fig. 1 can be simplified as,
where * represents the convolution operation; h RI R denotes the Room Impulse Response (RIR) [15] [11] . Therefore, we consider the combined effect of h Mic (t) and h RI R (t), and estimate them simultaneously. In the remaining of this paper, we shall refer to RI R (t) as environmental signature, as h RI R (t) is predominant. Since the environment signature uniquely specifies the acoustic recording system, it can be used to authenticate the integrity of captured audio. The blind estimation algorithm of environment signature in the existing literature will be elaborated in Section 2.2, and our proposed authentication and detection algorithm will be introduce in Section 3.
Environmental signature estimation
Blind dereverberation is a process of separating reverberant and dry signals from a single channel audio recording without exploiting the knowledge ofḣ RI R (t). Dereverberation methods can be divided into the following categories: (i) frequency domain methods [8] , (ii) time domain methods [1] , (iii) joint time-frequency domain methods [26] . Blind dereverberation has found a wide range of applications ranging from speech enhancement [28] to distant speech recognition [25] , acoustic environment identification [20, 21, 29, 30] , audio forensics [20] , etc. In the previous works [20, 21, 29, 30] , it was also experimentally verified that reverberation is quite effective for environment identification [21, 29, 30] and audio forensics [20] applications. In this paper, we shall use the frequency domain method to estimate the RIR. Specifically, we first introduce the environment signature which presents the log-spectrum magnitude of RIR contaminated by ambient noise, and then, elaborate on the corresponding estimation algorithm [8] . It can be archived by three steps approach as follows.
Step 1: Signature Expression
The temporal signal y(t) is divided into frames (128ms for each) with an overlapping rate of 50 %. The Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) representation of (1) can be expressed as:
where Y (k, l), S(k, l), H (k, l) and V (k, l) are the STFT coefficients (in the k th frequency bin and the l th frame) of y(t), s(t),ḣ RI R (t) and η(t), respectively. It is important to mention that (2) is valid if and only if the frame length of the STFT is larger than the duration of RIR, h RI R (t). Generally, acoustic channel varies much more slowly than the speech and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that |H (k, l)| does not vary significantly with l. Power spectrum of the noisy observation y(t) is expressed as
where
. Dividing both sides of (3) by |S(k, l)| 2 × |H (k, l)| 2 and transforming the resulting expression using logarithm operation results in:
Gaubitch et al. in [8] has shown the way to extract log |H (k, l)| and log ε(k, l) from the noisy observation |Y (k, l)|. However, in the application of audio forensics, the background noise provides useful information and its effectiveness has been experimentally verified in [30] . Thus, we define the environmental signature H as follows
where, L represents the total number of the frames. Note that in the definition of environmental signature (7), Y (k, l) is the spectrum of the observation audio signal, and S(k, l) is the spectrum of the clean audio signal, which is not available. The approximate spectrum of the clean audio,Ŝ(k, l), can be estimated as follows.
Step 2: Clean Log-Spectrum Estimation
In practice, S(k, l) is not available and can be approximated via the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). Given a data set consisting of clean speeches with various speakers and contents, each sample, s(n), is divided into overlapping windowed frames and proceeded by the STFT to obtain S(k, l). Mean substraction is applied to S(k, l) as follows,
where K is the total number of frequency bins and S log (k, l) represents the log-spectrum after mean substraction. For each frame, the RASTA filtered Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) are estimated, which results in an N -dimensional feature vector mfcc s (l) = [mf cc s (1, l) , . . . , mf cc s (N, l)] T , where l denotes the l th audio frame. The target Mmixture GMM defined by a mean vector, μ m , diagonal covariances matrix, m , and weights vector, π m , of each mixture, is trained by using the MFCCs. The probability distribution function for frame l and cepstral coefficient m is expressed as,
where N (mfcc s (l)|μ m , m ) represents the multivariate Gaussian distribution. The log-spectrum of clean speech can be estimated by weighted averaging over all frames as:
Step 3: Signature Estimation Then, the clean speech model of (10) is now used to estimate the acoustic distortion in (7). More specifically, the following steps are involved in estimating acoustic distortion given in (7): (i) a feature vector, mfcc y (l) = [mf cc y (1, l) , . . . , mf cc y (N, l)] T , of observation y(t) is obtained by applying RASTA filtering on estimate MFCC feature vector, (ii) the posterior probability of mfcc y (l) is calculated by substituting filtered feature vector into (9), which results inγ l,m for each mixture m = 1, 2, . . . , M. With the availability of posterior probability, spectrum of the direct signal of the l th frame can be expressed as:
Substituting the approximateŜ(k, l) in (11) into (7), the estimated signature can be expressed as:
As a remark note that the accuracy of the estimated RIR depends on the error between estimated spectrum, S(k, l), and the true spectrum, S(k, l).
Applications to audio forensics
A novel audio forensics framework based on the acoustic impulse response is proposed in this section. Specifically, we consider two application scenarios of audio forensics: (i) audio source authentication which determines whether the query audio/speech is captured in a specific environment or location as claimed; and (ii) splicing detection which determines whether the query audio/speech is original or assembled using multiple samples recorded in different environments and detects splicing locations (in case of forged audio).
Audio source authentication
In practice, the crime scene is usually secured and kept intact for possible further investigation. Thus, it is possible to rebuild the acoustic environmental setting, including the location of microphone and sound source, furniture arrangement, etc. Hence, it is assumed that the forensic expert can capture reference acoustic environment signature, denoted asĤ r , and compare it to the signatureĤ q extracted from the query audio recording. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the proposed authentication scheme is elaborated below:
1. Estimate the RIRs,Ĥ q andĤ r , from the query audio and reference audio according to the method described in Section 2.2, respectively, 2. Calculate the normalized cross-correlation coefficient ρ betweenĤ q andĤ r according to (13) ,
Compare the cross-correlation coefficient with an threshold T to determine the authentication of the query audio. Specifically, the following hypothesis testing rule is used, ρ < T : Forged; ρ ≥ T : As Claimed (14) The performance of the above authentication scheme depends on the threshold T . In the following part, a criteria is proposed to derive the optimal threshold.
Formulation of optimal threshold
Supposing that f e (ρ) represents the distribution of ρ, which is the correlation coefficient between the reference audio and the query audio captured in the identical environment. In this case,Ĥ q andĤ r are highly positive correlated. Similarly, f g (ρ) represents the distribution of ρ, which is the correlation coefficient between the reference audio and the query audio captured in different environments. In this case,Ĥ q andĤ r are expected to be independent. Due to the inaccurate estimation of signatures and the potential noise, the resulted correlation coefficients will diverge from the true values. The statistical distributions of ρ i s will be used to determine the optimal threshold. The binary hypothesis testing based on an optimal threshold, T in (14) , contributes to the following two types of errors: -Type I Error: Labeling an authentic audio as forged. The probability of Type I Error is called False Positive Rate (FPR), which is defined as,
where, F e is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of f e . -Type II Error: Labeling a forged audio as authentic. The probability of Type II Error is called False Negative Rate (FNR), which is defined as,
where, F g is the (CDF) of f g .
Then, the optimal decision boundary T can be determined by minimizing the combined effect of these errors as follows,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the control factor chosen by the forensic expert according to the practical applications. In the following section, we are trying to fit ρ using statistical models.
Deriving the optimal threshold in (17) requires the prior knowledge of f e (ρ) and f g (ρ) . One intuitive solution is using the empirical distributions (histograms) of ρ. However, this strategy results in high computing complexity of determining the optimal threshold in (17) . The anther disadvantage is that the closed-form of the threshold can not be determined according to specified FPR or FNR. In the next section, we fit the distributions using statistical models and elaborate the estimation of the model parameters, which can be used to calculate the threshold.
Distribution modeling and parameters estimation
To model distribution of ρ, we consider the same acoustic environment case first. That is, for identical acoustic environments, correlation coefficient, ρ, is very close to the extreme value (maximum value) of interval [−1, 1], e.g. ρ → 1. We experimentally find that the extreme value distribution is a good model in this case due to its simplification and low fitting error(shown in Fig. 3 and Section 4.2.1). The Probability Density Function (PDF) of extreme value distribution is expressed as [14] , f e (ρ|μ e , δ e ) = δ
where μ e and δ e represent the location and scale parameter, respectively. The parameters, μ e and δ e , can be estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. The likelihood of drawing N samples ρ i from an extreme value distribution with parameters μ e and δ e can be expressed as, The maximum likelihood estimation ofμ e andδ e can be expressed as follows,
Numerical methods such as gradient descent can be used to solve (22) . Figure 3 shows the plots of the true distributions of ρ, for the case of that the query audio and the recaptured audio are in the same environment, and the extreme value distribution with estimated parametersμ e = 0.72 andδ e = 0.11. It can be observed from Fig. 3 that, the estimated distribution is skewed left, and therefore, the extreme value distribution can model the true distribution reasonably well.
Similarly, correlation coefficient ρ betweenĤ q (k) andĤ r (k) estimated from the query audio and the recaptured audio which were made in two different environments is expected to be close to zero. In this case, correlation coefficient ρ is expected to obey a heavytailed distribution. To this end, the distribution of ρ(i), i = 1, . . . , M is modeled using the Generalized Gaussian [5] distribution. Motivation behind considering the generalized Gaussian model here is due to the fact that thicker tails will lead to more conservative error estimates, as demonstrated in Fig. 4 . The PDF of Generalized Gaussian distribution is given as follows,
where α g , β g , and μ g represent the scale, shape and mean parameters, respectively. The parameters can be estimated using the method of moments [5] as follows, 
where (x) is the Gamma function. Figure 4 shows the plot of the distribution of normalized correlation coefficients between H q (k) andĤ r (k), which are estimated from audio samples captured in different environments. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that the distribution of ρ fits reasonably well into the generalized Gaussian PDF. The goodness of fit is evaluated based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD). The KLD between the true distribution and generalized Gaussian fitted distribution is equal to 0.24 which indicates that the assumed generalized Gaussian distribution fits reasonably well with the assumed model. It can be observed from Figs. 3 and 4 that both distributions are heavy-tailed and therefore will overlap.
In some practical applications, the threshold should be selected to satisfy the maximum allowed FPR (τ ) requirement. The optimal threshold regarding to the specific FPR τ can be obtained via
where F −1 e represents the inverse function of F e . Subsequently, substituting (27) into (16) results in the FNR as follows
With these fitted statistical model (18), (27) can be deduced to
Audio splicing detection and localization
In this section, we will extend the method proposed in Section 3.1 to audio splicing detection. To illustrate audio splicing process, an audio clip is assembled from three segments, Seg1, Seg2, and The difference between splicing detection and source authentication is that the reference audio is usually not available. Hence, in our proposed scheme, we shall use the RIRs extracted from the previous frames as reference, and compare it with the coming frames. Specifically, the proposed scheme can be divided into two phase: raw detection and refinement. The procedure of raw detection is elaborated below:
1. Divide the query audio into overlapped frames with the rate of 50 % and estimate the RIR,Ĥ i q , from the i th frame according to the method in Section 2.2, 2. Calculate the cross-correlation coefficient between the RIRs of the i th frame and the previous frames according to (30) ,
q is the estimated channel response of the i th frame from the query audio. The term M is the length of query audio. M T is the rough estimation of M 1 . Figure 6a It should be noted that this framework for localizing forgery locations in audio requires an accurate estimate of the impulse response,Ĥ q (k). Any distortions inĤ q (k), will result in a number of false alarms. However, due to the lack of substantial reference frames, the average-based smoothing technique (30) is adopted to reduce the detection errors. Equation (30) first calculates the cross-correlation coefficient betweenĤ (1) q andĤ (2) q . Ifρ 2 > T , the second frame is authentic (come from the same location with the first frame). Then, it calculates the cross-correlation coefficients betweenĤ (1) q andĤ (3) q ,Ĥ (2) q andĤ (3) q , updates the coefficients according to the smoothing method in (30) and moves forward to the next frame, and so on. The average-based smoothing technique used in (30) results in a stable estimation of RIRs, which will reduce the decision error of (32).
Our experimental results show that the detection performance can be further improved by exploiting the correlation between adjacent frames. The motivation behind this is that tampering usually occurs in many consecutive frames instead of a few scattered frames. That means if neighborhoods of the current frame are forged, the current frame has a high probability of being labeled as forged also. Based on this reasonable assumption, local correlation between the estimated signatures extracted from adjacent frames is used to make the forgery localization approach robust to estimation errors. The refinement procedure is summarized as follows:
1. Detect the suspected frame using the raw detection method and set the label p i of the i th frame to 1 as follows,
2. Refine the results using neighborhood similarity score as follows,
where, W and R s represent the window size (e.g., W =3 or 5) and similarity score threshold (e.g., R s ∈ [0.7, 0.9]), respectively. N L is the length of p. q i = 1 indicates that the i th frame is detected as spliced.
Equation (34) means that, for the i th suspected frame, if the ratio of its adjacent frames being suspected exceeds R s , the i th frame will be labeled as spliced. It have been observed through experimentation that the refined algorithm significantly reduces the false alarm rates and improves detection performance. Section 4 provides performance analysis of the proposed method on both synthetic and real-world recordings.
Performance evaluation
The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is evaluated using two data sets: synthetic data, real-world human speech. Details for the data sets used, the experimental setup and the experimental results are provided below.
Data set and experimental setting
Firstly, the speech data of TIMIT corpus [7] was used to train the clean log-spectrum and generate the synthetic data. TIMIT consists of 6300 sentences: ten sentences spoken by each of 438 male and 192 female speakers. The data set is divided into a training set (462 speakers) and a test set (168 speakers) with entirely different sentence contents apart from the dialect diagnostics. Each utterance is approximately 3 seconds long with sampling frequency f s = 16 kHz. For training, the entire training set was processed using Hanning windowed frames (128ms for each) with overlapping rate of 50 %. 12 RASTA-MFCCs of each frame was calculated and used to train the GMM with 512 mixtures. For test, the ten sentences of each speaker in the test set were concatenated to form one utterance with an approximate duration of 30s. Synthetic room response generated by source-image method [16] for a rectangular room is convolved with the test speech. Each time, all the parameters used for room response simulation were randomly selected to generate the RIRs of different environments. Table 1 shows the candidate interval of parameters used.
For the second data set, real world data consisting of 60 speech recordings were used (the same data set used in [19] ). The speeches were recorded in four different environments: (1) outdoor; (2) small office (3.4 m×3.8 m×2.7 m, predominantly furnished with carpet and drywalls); (3) stairs (predominantly ceramic tiles and concrete walls); (4) restroom (5.2 m×4.3 m×2.7 m, predominantly furnished with ceramic tiles). In each recording environment, each of the three speakers (one male S 1 , two females S 2 and S 3 ) read five different texts. The audio samples were captured by a commercial-grade external microphone mounted on a laptop computer using Audacity 2.0 software. The audio was originally recorded with 44.1 kHz sampling frequency, 16 bits/sample resolution, and then downsampled to 16 kHz. The real world data set will be used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
In the case of splicing audio database generation, two signals, either artificial or realworld recorded, were selected and spliced by simply assembling them together in the time domain. Each time, the signals were randomly selected. In the practical application, the speech contents should be carefully chosen to make the spliced audio meaningful. And, in order to avoid any perceptible distortion, the splicing location should occur in the silent section.
Experimental results

Results on synthetic data
In this section, synthetically generated reverberant data were used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. First, randomly selected parameters from Table 1 were used to The optimal threshold T can be determined from the synthetic data as follows. The randomly generated RIRs H A and H B were convolved with the test data set, respectively, resulting in two simulated synthetic data sets from two virtual environments A and B. Fig. 8 . As discussed in Section 3.1, ρ A,i→A,j and ρ A,i→B,k can be modeled as the extreme value distribution and the generalized Gaussian distribution, respectively. The optimal threshold T for these distributions is determined as 0.3274 by setting λ = 0.5, which results in the minimal overall error of 2.23 %. It is important to mention that depending on the application at hand, λ and the corresponding optimal decision threshold, T , can be selected. In order to better understand the performance of the proposed scheme, we have also evaluated performance of the proposed method in terms of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) by varying the decision boundary. Figure 9 shows the ROC curve of True Positive Rate (TPR, which represents the probability that query audio is classified as forged, when in fact it is) vs False Positive Rate (FPR, which represents the probability that query audio is labeled as forged, when in fact it is not) on the test audio set. It can be observed from Fig. 9 that, for FPR > 3 %, T P R → 1. It indicates that the proposed audio source authentication scheme has almost perfect detection performance when the recaptured reference audios are available. In addition, the forensic analyst can recapture sufficient reference audio samples, which leads to more accurate and stable estimation of environment signature hence better detection performance. Furthermore, we also evaluate the performance of the proposed splicing detection algorithm for synthetic data. Two randomly selected speeches from the test set were convolved with H A and H B , resulting in two reverberant speeches RS A and RS B . And RS B was inserted into a random location within RS A . Figure 10a shows the plot (in time domain) of the resulting audio. It is barely possible to observe the trace of splicing by visual inspection, even for forensic experts. Figure 10b shows the detection output of the proposed algorithm with a frame size of 3s. It can be observed from Fig. 10 that the proposed forgery detection and localization algorithm has successfully detected and localized the inserted audio segment, RS B with 100 % accuracy.
The impact of frame size on performance of the proposed scheme is investigated next. Figure 11 shows the detection performance of the proposed forgery detection and localization algorithm as a function of the frame size (used to estimate the environmental signaturê H ). It is intuitive that a larger frame size would result in more accurate estimate ofĤ , hence higher detection accuracy. Forgery localization, on the other hand, has the localization granularity (≈ half of frame size) and thus requires a smaller frame size. In other words, decreasing frame size leads to a better localization resolution, but less accurate estimate of environment signature, which may reduce detection accuracy. It can be observed from Fig. 11 that for frame size > 1s, the splicing parts can be identified and localized with 100 % accuracy. Subsequently, for frame sizes between 500 ms and 1 s, the proposed scheme can still detect the splicing segments for carefully chosen threshold, instead of the trained "Optimal Threshold" in Section 3.1. For instance, in Fig. 11e , we can still obtain good detection and localization performance if the threshold is equal to 0.17. Reducing the frame size further deteriorates both the performance of detection accuracy and localization granularity (see also Fig. 11f ). It has been observed through extensive experimentation that for the data sets used here the frame size of 1s may be a good compromise and the optimal frame size should be determined according to the application at hand. 
Results on real world data
Effectiveness of the proposed audio splicing detection method has also been verified on real-world speech data. To achieve this goal, a data set consisting of 60 real world speech recordings of three speakers reading five different texts made in four acoustically different environments is used. In addition, the audio recordings made in the same environment with the same speaker (different text contents) is downsampled to 16 kHz and concatenated to generate each audio recording of 90s to 120s duration. For fair comparison, each forged audio is created by inserting audio segment (from other recording) into the middle of another recording. Figure 12 shows the detection results of the proposed scheme on real world recordings created by inserting speech recording of the 1 st speaker in the 1 st environment (red part in Fig. 12a ) in the middle of speech recording of the 2 nd speaker in the 3 rd environment [blue part in Fig. 12a ]. It can be observed from Fig. 12a that all three segments contain strong but similar background noise and splicing does not introduce any visual artifacts. The resulting audio is analyzed using the proposed splicing detection and localization method. It has been observed however that detection performance gradually deteriorates [e.g., both the FPR and FNR (the probability of query audio is labeled as authentic when in fact it is forged.) increases] for smaller frame sizes. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 12c&d . It can be observed that the proposed scheme is still capable of detecting/localizing the inserted frames for frame sizes 2s and 1s. However, the false alarm rate increases due to the limited length of the frame for the signature estimation.
It has also been observed through experimentation that some of the recordings in the data set contain stronger background noise than the signal shown in Fig. 12a , which deteriorates the accuracy of environment signature estimation, and hence degrades the performance of our proposed scheme. The noise effect can be reduced by using longterm average but at the cost of localization resolution. Denoising techniques may be applied to reduce the background noise which is the next consideration. Experimental results indicate that frame sizes between 2s and 3s resulted in good detection performance for median noise level, and for strong background noise, frame sizes over 5s may be needed for acceptable performance. Similar results were obtained for other forged recordings.
For this experiment, spliced audio is generated from two randomly selected audio recordings of different speakers made in different environments from the real-world data set. Two quantitative measures, TPR and FPR, are used to evaluate the frame-level detection performance. To achieve a smooth ROC plot, the TPR/FPR pair is computed by averaging over 50 runs for different frame sizes. Figure 13 shows the resulting ROC curves computed at different frame sizes. It can be observed from Fig. 13 that the overall detection accuracy improves for larger frame sizes. This is expected as larger frame sizes result in more accurate and stable estimation of environment signature. In addition, it can also be observed from Figs. 9 and 13 that, the detection performance of the proposed scheme deteriorates in the presence of ambient noise. Detection performance in the presence of ambient noise can be improved by using larger frame sizes but at the cost of lower forgery localization accuracy. 
Comparison results to Chen's method
In [3] , Chen et al. proposed an audio splicing detection method using the singularity analysis of wavelets. The authors claimed that malicious manipulations will introduce singularity points in the time domain of the signal. Experimental results show that the wavelets-based method can detect the locations of manipulation to some extent. Here, we compare the splicing detection performance of Chen's method to the proposed scheme in this paper. Firstly, we implement Chen's scheme and test its performance on synthetic data without noise. Figure 14 shows the detection results of Chen's method on clean speeches, where the audio is spliced by two clean speeches randomly selected from TIMIT database. Figure 14b shows the reconstructed signal from one of the high-frequency wavelet sub-band. It can be clearly noticed that there are two peaks (singularity points) at the location of splicing. Figure 14c shows the corresponding detection results with perfect localization accuracy. This results are consistent of the Fig. 11 in [3] .
Second, we add artificial noise to the spliced audio signal shown in Fig. 14a and reconduct the detection. Figure 15 shows the detection results of Chen's method for noisy speeches. It can be observed that Chen's method can still detect the location of the splicing. However, the artificial noise introduces a plenty of singularity points (inherent singularity points), which is falsely identified as splicing.
We evaluate Chen's method on the real-world recordings. To this end, forged (or spliced) audio recording is generated by splicing audio recordings made in two different environments. More specifically, speech recording of the 3 rd speaker made in the 3 rd environment (E3S3) is inserted in the middle of speech recording of the 1 st speaker made in the 1 st environment (E1S1). Figures 16 and 17 show the detecting results of Chen's method and the proposed scheme on real-world recording with and without pre-processing of denoising, respectively. Although Chen's method can detect the splicing location, a plenty of inherent singularity points are mis-detected as splicing locations, even a denoising method is applied before the detection. That means Chen's method generates high false alarm rate. However, the proposed scheme can correctly identify the forged frames with the accuracy of 95 % (without applying denoise method) and 98 % (after applying denoise method). Following conclusions are obtained from the experiments, -If the forged audio signal is noise-free, Chen's method works perfect (∼ 100 %). Overall, from Figs. 12, 13, 16 and 17 we can conclude that the proposed scheme outperforms Chen's method with higher robustness and lower false alarm rate. More experiments give the similar results and is omitted due to the limitation of the space. 18 Detection performance of the proposed scheme and Pan's scheme [22] . For fair comparison, frame size is set to 2s for both experiments. Red triangles represent the frames of recording of the 3 rd speaker in the 3 rd environment (E3S3) and blue circles represent frames of recording of the 1 st speaker in the 1 st environment (E1S1)
Comparison results to Pan's method
In this experiment, performance of the proposed framework is compared to the existing splicing detection scheme [22] , which uses inconsistency in local noise levels estimated from the query audio for splicing detection. Fig. 19 ROC curves of the proposed scheme and Pan's scheme [22] The forged real-world audio is generated as the same with the audio in Section 4.2.3. Figure 18a presents the time-domain plot of the spliced audio assembled from E1S1 (blue) and E3S3 (red). Figure 18b and c show the frame-level detection performance of the proposed scheme and Pan's scheme [22] , respectively. It can be observed from Fig. 18b&c that the proposed scheme is capable of not only detecting the presence of the inserted frames but also localizing these frames. On the other hand, Pan's scheme is unable to detect or localize the inserted frames. Inferior performance of Pan's scheme can be attributed to the fact that it only depends on the local noise level for forgery detection, which is almost the same in the forged audio used for analysis.
Shown in Fig. 19 are the ROC curves of the proposed method and Pan's method. It can be observed that the proposed method has very high true positive rate even when the false positive rate is lower than 5 %. However, Pan's method fail to detect the presence of spliced frames. Because Pan's method replies on the difference levels of the background noise. If the audio segments used for splicing have similar level of noise, Pan's method is unable to distinguish the difference between the two segments.
Performance comparison of the proposed scheme to Pan's scheme [22] can be summarized as follows: (i) superior performance of the proposed scheme can be attributed to RIR which is an acoustic environment related signature and is more reliable than the ambient noise level alone; (ii) the proposed scheme models acoustic environment signature by considering both the background noise (including the level, type, spectrum, etc.) and the RIR (see (7)); and (iii) the proposed scheme relies on the acoustic channel impulse response, which is relatively hard to manipulate as compare to the background noise based acoustic signature.
Extended results on real-world meeting recordings (AMI Corpus)
The AMI Meeting Corpus is a multi-modal data set consisting of 100 hours of meeting recordings (http://groups.inf.ed.ac.uk/ami/corpus/), which was recorded in three different meeting rooms. This database is very challenging as it not only captures the real background noise and the RIR, but also the continuing and overlapped conversation spoken by nonnative speakers of English. We're also not aware of the recording configurations of these database, such as the type of microphone, sound source, room size, etc. Two sets (refer to ES2014b and IS1009b) recorded at two different meeting rooms were downloaded and used in this paper. The total length of ES2014b and IS1009b approximate to 5 hours and 4.5 hours, respectively.
In this section, two subsets (ES2014b and IS1009b) of AMI corpus database captured in three different meeting rooms is used to generate the spliced speech. Each subset consists of 8 audio files with the length of 38 minutes and 34 minutes for ES2014b and IS1009b, respectively. Figure 20 shows an example of the detection result. It can be observed that the proposed scheme can accurately identify the splicing location. With the increasing of the frame size, the detection performance increases significantly. Because of that larger frame size can result in better estimation of the environmental signature. A frame size of 3s results in the best detection performance. Figure 21 shows another example of the detection results, where the forged speech signal is generated by assembling two different segments from the database. It can be seen from Figs. 20 and 21 that the proposed scheme is also effective of detecting the splicing of the real-world meeting room recordings.
In order further to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on the practical database, we successively divide the audio files in ES2014b and IS1009b into small segments with the length of 2 minutes, respectively. Then, we randomly select one segments from ES2014b and another from IS1009b, and assemble them together to generate the spliced speech. Finally, the detection performance is tested on the spliced speech. We repeat this procedure 1000 times and Fig. 22 shows the distribution of the detection accuracy. It can be observed that the overall average accuracy is over 96 %. The minimum accuracy is also higher than 90 %. The small variance also indicates that the proposed method is robust. From the experimental results in Figs. 20, 21, and 22 illustrate that the proposed method is applicable to the practical application.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel method for audio splicing detection and localization has been proposed. The magnitude of acoustic channel impulse response and ambient noise have been considered to model the intrinsic acoustic environment signature. The acoustic environment signature is jointly estimated using the spectrum classification technique. Distribution of the correlation coefficient between the query audio and the reference audio has been used to determine the optimal decision threshold, which is used for the frame-level forgery detection. A frame with similarity score less than the optimal threshold is labeled as spliced and as authentic otherwise. For splicing localization, a local correlation based on the relationship between adjacent frames has been adopted to reduce frame-level detection errors. The performance of the proposed scheme has been evaluated on two data sets with numerous experimental settings. Experimental results has validated the effectiveness of the proposed scheme for both forgery detection and localization. Performance of the proposed scheme has also been compared against the previous works for audio splicing detection [3, 22] . Performance comparison has indicated that the proposed scheme outperforms the approach presented in [3] and [22] . The effectiveness of the proposed method is proved on the real-world meeting recording database (AMI corpus). The proposed scheme may be a good candidate for the practical digital audio forensics applications.
The limitation of the proposed method includes: 1) the proposed method can only detect the splicing forgery using audio segments captured in different environments, 2) detection result for boundary frame is unreliable, and 3) it is unable to detect very small insertions (insertions less than or equal to frame size used).
Future works includes: 1)analyzing the impact of moving recording environment on the proposed method; 2) improving the robustness of the proposed method to noise; and 3)analyzing the performance under the case of anti-forensics (e.g. if the attacker confuses the system by editing the signatures).
